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MARY ELLEN WOLFE*

The Milk River:
Deferred Water Policy Transitions
in an International Waterway
ABSTRACT
An examination of the manner in which the United States and
Canada settled their respective portions of the Milk River basin
reveals the historicalsimilaritiesand differences that characterized
the development of the region on both sides of the 49th parallel.
Encouraged by government policies and by two railroads,settlers
came into this isolated prairieregion and water disputes soon
erupted. These disputes provoked two far-reachingdecisions: the
United States Supreme Court's Winters decision in 1908, which
granted reserved water rights to the Fort Belknap tribe; and the
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, which apportionedthe waters of the
Milk between Canadaand the United States. Since that time, water
development in the American portion of the basin has proceeded
largely without reference to undeveloped tribal reserved water rights
and Alberta's undeveloped shareof the river. In theface of recurring
water shortages in Montana'ssegment of the river, two native groups
and the province of Alberta now plan to develop their shares of the
river. This paperfinds the roots of the currentsituation in the nature
of water policies which evolved in the region before 1910. It posits the
concept of deferred water policy transitionsto describe how policies
made by state law, by federal judicial mandate and by international
treaty have been implemented differentially in Montana.
Scholars of Canadian-American relations are just now beginning
to draw comparisons between the two nations' particular approaches for
*Water Education Specialist for the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Education, and Coordinator of the Montana Watercourse, Montana State University, Bozeman.
This article was prepared with the support of the Ford Foundation, while she was a Research
Associate with the 49th Parallel Institute on Canadian-American Relations at Montana State
University, Bozeman. The views stated here are the author's and do not represent opinions
of the Montana Watercourse or the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation.
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allocating and protecting their respective waterways.1 This article examines the origins of the current water "crisis" in the Milk River basinshared between northern Montana, southern Alberta, and the southwestern corner of Saskatchewan-and the manner in which the respective
Canada/Alberta and United States/Montana institutional frameworks
evolved to allocate the scarce waters of the region.
The Milk River begins in the mountains of Glacier National Park
in northern Montana. Its two main branches flow northeast through the
Blackfeet Indian Reservation and loop across the international border into
southern Alberta for several hundred miles where the two branches converge. The river then turns south across the 49th parallel into Montana
again, where it travels eastward for close to 245 miles before entering the
Missouri River drainage basin below Fort Peck Reservoir. 2 The geographic features of the river make Canada and the United States at once
both upstream and downstream users of the water resources (Figure 1).
Today, the Milk River is a water system stretched to capacity. The river
was first diverted for irrigation in Montana in 1889; in Alberta, irrigation
permits in the basin date to the early 1900s.3 Efforts to supply water on a
large scale in Montana's portion of the basin were undertaken as one of
the first water projects of the Reclamation Act of 1902. 4 Since that time, the
development of irrigation in the state has continued apace, and today
approximately 800 Montana water users experience significant shortages
four out of every ten years.5 Irrigation development in Alberta lagged
behind that in Montana. An average 40,000 acre-feet of water, which represents the provincial share allocated to Canada by the 1909 Boundary
Waters Treaty,6 flows unused into the state where it is readily available for
1. Border Waters: Proceedings of a Conference on U.S./Canada Transboundary Management
(1987) (published by 49th Parallel Institute for Canadian-American Relations, Mont. State
University). U.S.-Canada Transboundary Resource Issues, 26 Nat. Res. J.201 (1986); see especially LeMarquand, Preconditions to Cooperation in Canada-United States Boundary Waters, 26
Nat. Res. J.221 (1986); Sadler, The Management of Canada-U.S.Boundary Waters: Retrospect and
Prospect, 26 Nat. Res. J.359 (1986).
2. L. Bloomfield & G. Fitzgerald, Boundary Waters Problems of Canada and the United

States: The International Joint Commission 1912 -1958, at 89 (1958).
3. Letter from the Secretary of War to the United States House Committee on Rivers &Har-

bors, Milk River Montana, H.R. Doc. No. 88, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.114 (1933); S.Sando, Potential
for Increasingthe Milk River IrrigationProject Water Supply with St. Mary River Water 1, (report
by Mont. Dept. Nat. Res. and Conservation, Helena) (1987); Milk River Basin Study: Water
Use 20 (1980) (report by Planning Services Branch, Planning Div., Alberta Environment,
Edmonton, Alberta).
4. The Reclamation Act of 1902, Pub. L. No. 161, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.).
5. Milk River: Making It Meet the Need (1988) (public information brochure by Milk River
Irrigation Districts, Mont. Dep't Nat. Res. and Conservation, and United States Bureau of
Reclamation).
6. Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters, Jan. 11, 1909, United States-Great Britain, art. 6,36
Stat. 2448, T.I.A.S. No. 548. Among other things, the Boundary Waters Treaty apportioned the
Milk and St. Mary Rivers. It divided these waters between the United States and Canada and
outlined the principles by which future disputes would be settled. The treaty's guiding principle is that each country has equal and similar rights in the use of border waters.
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irrigators downstream. However, a comparatively small number of agricultural water users in Alberta's Milk River basin have pressured the provincial government to use the river. As a result, Alberta Environment now
plans to develop a 134,500 to 251,300 acre-feet storage reservoir to allow
for the province's full appropriation of its share of the river.7 The threat
Alberta's proposed storage reservoir poses to Montana irrigators is compounded by the reserved water rights 8 claims of the Fort Belknap and
Blackfeet Indian reservations in Montana's Milk River basin.9 The concept
of tribal reserved water rights was first enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court in 1908, in response to a dispute between irrigators on the
Fort Belknap Indian Reservation and neighboring Montana farmers over
the Milk River. In Winters v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that
with the creation of every Indian reservation, a right to sufficient water
was implicitly reserved to fulfill the purposes for which the reservation
was established. 10 The priority date of each tribe's reserved water right
was the date of the reservation's creation, which in the case of Fort
Belknap was 1888.11 Today, the Fort Belknap Tribes' continued claims to
water in the central portion of the basin and the Blackfeet Tribe's claims to
the headwaters of the river (which also date to 1888) intensify the potential for water 12shortages for the many established non-Indian water users
downstream.
Water supplies in the Milk River basin are stretched to their limits, not unlike many other western river basins, which are now manifesting similar circumstances. As an international geopolitical entity-a river
basin spanning separate and distinct national political regimes-the Milk
River affords an opportunity to view the historical evolution of Canadian
and American water policies through a comparative lens. What can be
learned, for example, by comparing the way water allocation policies have
evolved on both sides of the international divide? Why has water in Mon7. Alberta Plans Impoundment, Milk River Dig. 4 (1989) (published by 49th Parallel Inst.).
Alberta Environment is the provincial governmental agency responsible for water planning
and development.
8. The doctrine of reserved rights, articulated in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564
(1908), assures that Indian lands and federal public lands set aside by the government for a
particular purpose will have adequate water. It recognizes rights to a quantity of water sufficient to fulfill the purposes of the reservation, dating back, at least, to the date of the establishment of the reservation.
9. The Rocky Boys Reservation also has claims to tributary flows of the Milk River, but
because these claims are comparatively small, they will not be discussed in this paper. It is
possible that when the river is finally fully adjudicated, Rocky Boys claims may have significant effects on "junior" water rights holders in the lower portion of the Milk River basin.
10. Winters, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
11. Agreement with the Assiniboin and Gros Ventre of Fort Belknap, Jan. 21,1887, 25 Stat.
124. Lewotsky, Indian Reserved Water Rights, Boundaries Carved in Water: 8 Mo. River Brief
Series 1 (1988).
12. Letter from S. Cottingham, Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission to
M. Wolfe (Mar. 27, 1990). The Blackfeet and Fort Belknap reservations were created at the
same time from the "Great Blackfeet" Reservation (created in 1874) which comprised the
whole northern part of Montana. Id.
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tana's portion of the basin been overallocated, and why has Alberta's
water use flagged behind? Why have policies set in place many years
ago--the 1908 Winters decision and the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty-

apparently had little effect in the equitable allocation of the scarce waters
of the Milk? The answers to these questions are diverse and complex, and
they find their origins in the past.
THE EVOLUTION OF WATER POLICY
More than in western Canada, water policy in the western United

States evolved as an afterthought: the means to develop and share the
scarce water resources of the arid prairies sprang up in the western states

in response to local circumstances and local needs. Montana water allocation, specifically, was a state concern, which grew haphazardly from the

inadequacies of early federal land allocation policies.' 3 In western Canada, in contrast, natural resources were, from the very first, the property of
the Crown. Consequently, from the earliest days of settlement there, water
14
resource development was carefully administered and controlled.
In both countries, the water allocation policies that evolved
reflected the differing cultural values and attitudes of those who formu-

lated them. One important element separating Canadian and American
attitudes was the relationship each country developed toward Native

Americans (Blackfeet, Asssiniboine and Gros Ventre). 15 The British and
Canadian trappers and traders of the Hudson's Bay and Northwest Companies recognized the value of establishing long-term trading relation-

ships with the Native Americans of the northern Plains. In contrast, an
acrimonious relationship existed between American fur traders and Indians. John Ewers, an American who lived with the Blackfeet for years,
traced tribal animosity to the returning expedition of Meriwether Lewis

and William Clark. At one point, the two explorers separated, and it was
then that Clark and a small group of men had a skirmish with several Piegan Indians and a Native was killed. Thereafter, the Blackfeet distinguished between "their old friends, 'the Northern white men,'16 and their
new enemies, the Americans, whom they called 'Big Knives."'
13. W. Webb, The Great Plains 450 (1936).
14. E. Mitchner, William Pearce and Federal Government Activity in Western Canada:
1882-1904 at 36 (1971).
15. The Blackfeet Tribe, comprised of the Piegan, Blackfeet and Blood bands, occupies the
headwaters region of the Milk River basin today. The Gros Ventres and Assiniboines Tribes
together occupy the Fort Belknap Reservation in north-central Montana along the Milk River.
16. J.Ewers, The Blackfeet: Raiders on the Northwest Plains at 46 (1958). Lewis and Clark
can be credited with more than generating Blackfeet hostility; it was they who gave the Milk
River its name. American histories of the region usually begin with Captain Lewis' journal
account from the confluence of the Missouri with the Milk on May 8, 1805: "The water has
peculiar whiteness, such as might be produced by a tablespoon full of milk in a dish of tea,
and this circumstance induced us to call it Milk river." The Journals of the Expedition Under
the Command of Capts. Lewis and Clark, at 130 (N. Biddle, ed. 1962).
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The presence of the fierce Blackfeet and other Indians in the area
were strong deterrents to permanent settlement until the closing decades
of the 19th century. But by the late 1880s, all of the indigenous peoples of
the region had been successfully contained on reservations in the United
States and on reserves across the border in Canada. 17 The subjugation of
the Indians of the Milk River region opened the door to settlement. On
both sides of the border the cattle ranchers came first. They found the
shortgrass prairies to be ideal for their roving herds. The wide open range
allowed for the rapid growth of the "ranching frontier." 18 The deep meandering valleys also made it possible for particularly enterprising ranchers
to begin to irrigate riparian lands, thereby developing the means to raise
forage crops for winter feed. 19 However, Canadian and American policies
20
addressing the issue of water for irrigation in the West emerged slowly.
The water policies that evolved on both sides of the 49th parallel mirrored
to a considerable degree each nation's relationships with the Indians of the
Milk River region: early white-Indian relationships north of the border
were comparatively orderly and restrained, whereas south of the border
the emphasis on private initiative and individual freedom for whites
resulted in conflict with the Indians. 21 These divergent developments
helped to create the differing situations in Alberta's and Montana's segments of the Milk River today.
At first glance, policy initiatives undertaken in both nations were
quite similar. For example, both countries passed their own versions of
Homestead Acts. The U.S. passed its Homestead Act in 1862, 22 and Canada followed with the Dominion Lands Act of 1872.23 Both policies provided free land to settlers willing to comply with certain minimal
conditions, and both were meant to expedite frontier settlement. 24 It took
little time for settlers on both sides of the boundary to discover that the
arbitrary amounts of allocated "free" land were unsuitable for subsistence
farming west of the 100th meridian because of inadequate water.25 The
critical question, therefore, arose almost immediately: Who would recognize the value of water and develop a system for its allocation?
It was 1877 before the United States passed any federal policy
which addressed the issue of irrigation. The Desert Lands Act required
17. C. Gunderson, The History of the Milk River Valley, at 58-9 (1951). See G. Friesen, The
Canadian Prairies: A History, 128-161 (1984); M. Malone, & R. Roeder, Montana: A History
of Two Centuries 06-09 (1976).
18. D. Breen, The Canadian Prairie West and the Ranching Frontier: 1874 -1924 at 4 (1983).
19. Id.; Gunderson, supra note 13, at 92-97.
20. Webb, supra note 13, at 353.
21. P. Newman, Caesars of the Wilderness at xxi (1987); and Webb, supra note 13 at 364.
22. 12 Stat. 392, ch. 75 (1862).
23. G. Friesen, supra note 17, at 183.
24. G. Friesen, supra note 17, at 183--85; Webb, supra note 13, at 404.
25. G. Friesen, supra note 17, at 183-85; Webb, supra note 13, at 411-12.
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private landholders to irrigate at least a portion of their 640 acre parcels as
one condition for retaining possession of the land.2 6 What the act failed to
recognize was that the settler who purchased the land might have made a
worthless investment if there was no available water to make his bit of
desert bloom. Eminent historian Walter Prescott Webb 27characterized this
particular act as a "fine example of political bungling".

Officials in Canada carefully observed the American settlement
experience. From the earliest days, they were determined to learn from the
mistakes they saw being played out to the South. Therefore, the federal
government adopted policies to assure that development of the natural
resources of the Canadian frontier was accomplished in a more orderly
fashion. The Dominion Lands Act first required, for example, cabinet-level
approval of every application for a free 160 acre parcel of land, a policy
that predictably frustrated settlers and caused ill will toward the government.2 8 The policy was revised and administratively loosened by 1876,
but thereafter procedural efficiency at the local level became a foremost
objective.2 9
William Pearce, chief federal agent in Canada's Northwest Territories responsible for planning and implementing government policies
regarding the development of land and water resources, was the first to
recommend that federal water rights legislation be adopted before rather
than after settlement. A regular observer of the American experience,
Pearce urged that Canada not repeat the American experience, where private control of water resources came first: "This situation had always
resulted in bitter business competition to the detriment of the individual
30
settlers... and a volume of litigation of benefit only to lawyers".
Instead, Pearce suggested that the federal government should
establish
31
strong central control over the allocation of frontier waters.
Drought catalyzed support for Pearce among southern Alberta
settlers. In 1894, Canada enacted the Northwest Irrigation Act.32 Drafted
by Pearce, this was the first federal legislation that addressed problems of
water allocation. The Act introduced "stringent licensing procedures that
required incorporation, a detailed survey, proof of beneficial use of water,
public review, expedient implementation and operations consistent with
26. Desert Land Act of 1877, 243 U.S.C. § 321-339 (1988). The Act applied to any land
within the United States, except mineral and timber lands, that was not susceptible to cultivation without irrigation. It allowed settlers to claim 640 acres at a rate of $1.25 per acre (or
25 cents down and one dollar within three years). In order to hold the land, the settler had to
irrigate a portion of it within three years.
27. Webb, supra note 13, at 414.
28. Mitchner, supranote 14, at 35-36.
29. Id. at 36-39.

30. Id. at 221.
31. Id. at 215.
32. The Northwest Irrigation Act, 57-58 Vic. c. 30, S.C. 1894, c. 30.
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approved plans". 33 In short, it established a carefully controlled national
administrative system to assure orderly and systematic water resource
allocation.
In contrast to the Canadian administrative system, the United
States Congress approached the question of western water allocation
"timidly". 3Persistent trepidation on the part of the federal government
left the issue, by default, in the hands of the states. In Montana in particular, the version of water appropriation that evolved is best described as
laissez-faire. In the Milk River basin, water rights claims were made with
abandon. From the time the first water was put to use in Montana's portion of the Milk River in 1889 until 1973, the state's water appropriation
process was grossly deficient in any meaningful, centralized accounting,
regulation and control. 35 Montana law professor Albert W. Stone noted
that from 1897, when the Montana Supreme Court made it optional for
irrigators to comply with an 1885 statutory requirement to post notice of
an intended water diversion, to 1973, a vast number of water rights claims
were made "for which there was no record of any kind."3 6 Furthermore,
those irrigators that did post and file notice often did so before putting the
water to use, which led "to the filing of grossly excessive claims, totally
unrelated to the actual amount finally diverted or used." 3 7 Considering
such laissez-faire water allocation, it is little wonder that water came to be
overappropriated in Montana's segment of the Milk River basin.
Persistent competition between Canada and the United States,
each seeking to lay first claim to the territorial resources of the Northwest
frontier, was also significant. During the late 1880s, this competition was
reflected in the push to construct transcontinental railroad corridors on
both sides of the border.
The role of the Great Northern Railroad, built straight through
the Milk River basin to Havre, Montana by 1887, and that of the Canadian
Pacific Railroad in the early settlement of Southern Alberta (1883) can
hardly be overestimated. Both endeavors were essential to the establishment of permanent non-Indian populations in the region. Both governments cooperated with private enterprise to populate their frontiers. On
both sides of the 49th Parallel, those who promoted settlement were reluc33. Address by I.Clarke, A Brief History of Prairie Settlement, at the Water Resources Conference, Lethbridge, Alberta, (Nov. 21,1988).
34. Webb, supranote 13, at 353.
35. Letter from the Secretary of War, supranote 3, at 114.
36. A. Stone, Montana Water Adjudications: A Centennial History, 14 W. Wildlands 4, 1824(1988). A claim was made in Montana by simply putting the water to use. Often the new
user would post a notice at the point of diversion to stake out a claim, but such posting was
not necessary to acquire a legal right. As a result, water allocation claims were commonly
made without formal record. Id.
37. Id.
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tant to advertise the need for water, until recurring droughts made irrigation unavoidable.
The story begins with James J. Hill, "the barbed-wire, shaggy
headed, one-eyed old son of a bitch of western railroading," who took a
personal interest in bringing immigrant settlers to the Milk River basin.38
Hill (a Canadian by birth) saw real opportunities for a transportation corridor across Montana after he pushed his St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway line from the Red River Valley, west to Minot, North Dakota
in 1886. His effort was assisted by a federal grant of 75 feet of land on
either side of the railroad bed and land for one station along the line every
ten miles. 39 Between May and October of 1887, crews of up to 8,650 workers laid an average 3-1/4 miles of track per day from
Minot to the rail cen40
ter in Havre, and then southwest to Great Falls.
Once the railroad line was laid, Mr. Hill turned to its promotion.
He energetically sought settlers for the Milk River basin so his investment
would pay off. Hill missed no opportunity to advertise. The IrrigationAge,
a monthly journal for farmers, helped make his case when it boasted:
"Gardeners grow potatoes weighing three or four pounds, rutabagas
tip41
ping the scales at ten pounds and turnips as large as wash basins."
However, the advertising efforts were slow to bring results.
Incoming populations were but a trickle until the second decade of the
20th century. To stimulate interest, the railroad offered specially priced
tickets to homeseekers. Immigration agents kept statistics on the numbers
of people who took advantage of the Great Northern's discounted tickets.42 By 1910, the newspaper in the town of Havre, which served as the
headquarters for the western extension of the railroad to the Pacific coast,
and a stock shipping center for the area, noted that homeseekers were
flooding into the valley at a rate of 150 per day.43 Clearly, the calculated
boosterism of the Great Northern Railroad finally paid off.44 One histori-

38. Malone, supra note 13, at 133. Most of the towns along Montana's segment of the river,
for example, owe their very existence to the persistence of James J.Hill.
39. Water Resources Survey, Hill County, Montana (State Water Conservation Board, Helena, MT) at 10 (1967).
40. Id.
41. Shomaker, Irrigationin Montana, 12 Irrigation Age 332 (1898).
42. Great Northern Railroad Archives, Minn. Hist. Soc'y, St. Paul, MN (Box 4022, File 5 at
1-6; notes to research completed in 1988).
43. B. Mentzer, Milking the Milk River: The Evolution of Irrigation Practices Along Montana's 49th Parallel at 2 (1989).
44. The term boosterism is frequently used in historical studies of the development of the
West in Canada and the United States because the railroad companies were known to go
abroad and recruit immigrants to settle the frontier. See D. Jones, Empire of Dust at 21-22
(1989); Thomas, History ofAgriculture on the Prairiesto 1914, in The Prairie West at 27 (R. Francis ed.1985).
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cal account reports that almost every 160-acre tract was eventually
claimed. 45
To assure that such a complete land buyout came to pass, the
railroad diligently protected the authenticity of its claim that there was no
need for irrigation in the basin. In 1889, the Great Northern Railroad went
to court to stop construction of an irrigation canal from the Milk River. The
professed reason for the lawsuit differed from the real one. The railroad
claimed a water right for all of the water in the river for its steam locomofives. The real reason for the suit was to prevent word spreading that irrigation was necessary46in the basin, for fear such knowledge might deter
incoming settlement.
Hill's reach also extended into Canada. In 1879, in close collaboration with a number of Canadian investors, Hill promoted the idea of an
"all-Canadian" route to the Pacific at the highest levels of the Canadian
government. Before the feat could be accomplished, Hill played the turncoat and launched his competitive initiative to construct the aforementioned American rail corridor to the South. As a result of what one
Canadian writer called Hill's "conniving duplicity," Prime Minister MacDonald, who always found the American way of life distasteful, determined to beat Hill at his own game. 4 7 To allay fears in Ottawa that
American intrusions into Canada's Northwest Territories might lead to
eventual possession, the choice was made to lay the Canadian Pacific Railroad line across the arid lands to the south, in lieu of an alternative proposal to cross through the more fertile regions of the North Saskatchewan
River Valley.48 By 1863, the Canadian Pacific Railroad was constructed
and reached past Calgary to the Rocky Mountains with astonishing
speed. 49
The first nonIndian settlers in southern Alberta were American
"adventurers, traders, retired North West Mounted Police, Texas cowboys, ranchers and remittance men." 50 By 1900, more than 1,000 Mormons
escaping religious persecution in the United States established homes in
southern Alberta. Like their neighbors to the south, these and other immi51
grants quickly discovered the importance of water in this arid region.
45. Water Resources Survey, by Blaine County, Montana at 12 (1967)(State Water Conservation Board, Helena, Mt.). The original 160 acre limit of the Homestead Act of 1862,12 Stat.
392, ch. 75, was grossly insufficient for sustaining life in the arid Milk River basin. It represented an attempt to transfer land settlement practices that were adequate in the eastern
United States to a region very different in nature. The Desert Lands Act of 1877 was one

attempt to adapt land laws to the realities of the western landscape.
46. Water Resources Survey, supranote 45.
47. Mitchner, supra note 14, at 9; Friesen, supranote 17, at 179.
48. Id.
49. Friesen, supranote 17, at 179. It is noteworthy that William Van Home, the project engineer, is said to have been driven by a single consideration as he completed the job: "to stop
Hill from gaining a foothold north of the 49th parallel." Mitchner, supra note 14, at 9.
50. F. Gershaw, A Brief History of Southern Alberta 77 (1956). Remittance men were "sons
of good English families who received money, i.e. remittance from home."
51. Mitchner, supranote 14, at 209.
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Using tactics similar to Hill's, the Canadian Pacific Railroad and
the Canadian federal government promoted settlement in southern
Alberta. For example, when settlement was slow, senior Canadian officials
downplayed the need for irrigation in the Northwest just as the Great
Northern had done in Montana. 52 The government turned a deaf ear to
demands for assistance
for irrigation until passage of the Northwest Irri53
gation Act of 1894.
The early history of railroad development in the Milk River
basin reveals threads common to early Canadian and American experiences: the importance of the railroad for encouraging and facilitating settlement; the cooperation of the various governments and railroad
enterprises to get the job done; reluctance on the part of developers to
acknowledge publicly the need for irrigation; and, the ultimate acceptance
that irrigation was a necessity because of severe recurring droughts.
Despite these similarities, the fact remains that American development of the Milk River basin greatly exceeded that in Canada. It seems
likely that this difference is the result of at least three significant historical
factors. First, the Great Northern Railroad passed directly through the
river basin on the state side to Havre, whereas in Alberta, the Canadian
Pacific line was laid further to the North, outside of the Milk River basin.
Second, Montana's laissez faire water policy actually facilitated water
development, whereas Canada's more carefully regulated water policy
effectively limited it. Third, two critical water policy formulations, that
enunciated in the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 and that of the United
States Supreme Court in their 1909 Winters decision, were effectively
ignored for over six decades. To fully understand the implications of this
third factor, familiarity with the historical events which catalyzed these
two policy statements is essential.
AN INTERNATIONAL WATER POLICY
FOR THE MILK RIVER BASIN
The homesteading efforts of two federal governments and
diverse private enterprises insured that international competition for the
water resources of the Milk River region would become an issue. The St.
Mary River, which originates adjacent to the Milk River in Glacier
National Park, was the first subject of dispute.54 In the negotiations leading up to the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, the St. Mary played a critical role, so much so that the final treaty division of both the Milk and the
St. Mary mandated that the two rivers be considered as one.55 Because of
52. Id. See A. den Otter, Irrigation in Southern Alberta, 1882-1901 at 3 (1975).
53. Mitchner, supranote 14, at 221-31.
54. Unlike the Milk, the St. Mary moves north into Alberta where it meanders to the Northeast and then joins the Belly and Oldman Rivers to form the South Saskatchewan River,
which eventually becomes part of the Hudson Bay drainage.
55. Boundary Waters Treaty, supranote 6.
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this treaty-imposed unity, a history of the international relationship
* regarding the Milk River must begin with its neighbor, the St. Mary.
Competition for the St. Mary River began in 1891, when the twoyear old Montana legislature asked the United States Congress to undertake surveys of the region to examine the feasibility of constructing a
diversion to augment the flows of the Milk River. The plan was to divert
St. Mary water south of the international boundary to the Milk, and then
convey it to the lower end of the valley (in Montana) via the Canadian
stretch of the river. Colonel E.S. Nettleton, Chief Engineer of the United
States Department of Agriculture who made a reconnaissance of the
region, concluded that "the United States had a right to divert the water of
the St. Mary for beneficial uses in Montana... especially so long as it [was]
unappropriated by the Canadians." 5 6
When William Pearce, Canadian Dominion Lands Board57 representative and Superintendent of Mines, attended the Third International
Irrigation Congress in the United States in 1894,58 he became alarmed by
talk of the proposed American St. Mary Diversion. Although the idea had
been discussed since the first state legislature convened in 1889, for several years, Pearce noted that with Montana's congressional delegation and
James J.Hill pushing the idea, chances of success were good. Great Northern Railway interests wanted to irrigate the lands along the line in the
lower Milk Valley, and Canadian development plans could be jeopardized. 59
Pearce strongly recommended that the federal government
secure Canada's future use of the St. Mary in southern Alberta in order to
not lose the ability to use the water because of failure to develop its legal
claims. He apparently hoped that the establishment of a prior claim to the
waters of the St. Mary in Canada would deprive the Americans of their
right to construct the planned diversion further upstream. At the very
least, he hoped that a survey of the river and the potential for diversion
canals be undertaken. In 1902, the Canadian government hired American
engineer George Anderson to investigate the planned Montana diversion
of St. Mary waters to the Milk. His report concluded that the plan was
totally impractical. Furthermore, it would "rob Canada
of the use of
60
waters of a river flowing mainly through her territory."
56. N. Dreiziger, The Canadian-American Irrigation Frontier Revisited: The International
Origins of Irrigation in Southern Alberta, 1885-1909 at 215 (1975).
57. The Dominion Lands Board was the federal agency which administered the Dominion
Lands Act in Canada beginning in 1882. William Pearce was appointed to the Board at its
inception. In this role, for over 12 years he was the chief federal agent in Canada's North West
Territories responsible for planning and implementation of federal government policies
relating to the development of all land, timber, mineral and water resources.
58. The 3rd Irrigation Congress took place in Denver in 1894. There representatives from
the various western states and territories convened to discuss the virtues of irrigation and to
strategize approaches to encourage governments (state and federal) to adopt laws to facilitate the irrigation of the arid lands. See Webb, supra note 13 at 358.
59. Mitchner, supra note 14, at 251.
60. Id. at 257.
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The dispute over the St. Mary led to the construction of two St.
Mary canals. One was undertaken by a Mormon settlement in southern
Alberta near Cardston in 1898 and completed in 1900. The other was
begun by the United States Bureau of Reclamation in 1907 and delivered
the first St. Mary water to Milk River project users downstream in 1911.61
Competition for the St. Mary River earlier had focused attention
on the Milk River as well. J.S. Dennis, Chief Inspector of Surveys in Canada's Northwest Territories, completed surveys in 1902 that suggested the
feasibility of diverting waters from the Milk River for use in Canada. This
action suggests that Canadians were considering that if the Americans
diverted St. Mary waters to the Milk River stateside, then Canadians
should take that water out for irrigation of their lands further east when
the river looped north again into their territory.62 By 1904, the Canadian
Northwest Irrigation Company had constructed what is known today as
the "Spite Canal" from the Milk River. Thus the residents of southern
Alberta "structurally" called the Americans' bluff.63
The Canadian action sparked concern in Montana that was conveyed to officials in Washington, D.C. within the year (1904). It was finally
clear that negotiation was necessary to forestall a full-blown international
confrontation over the St.Marys and Milk Rivers. The first to recognize the
problem were lower officials and technical experts of the two federal governments. For one, the United States Reclamation Service called for negotiations. It was interested in assuring that spring-diverted waters from the
St. Mary would be guaranteed passage to the Milk. Canadians, on the
agreement to the entire flow of the St.
other hand, hoped to obtain an
64
Mary river during the summer.
Competition for the waters of these two rivers was one important issue that brought Washington and Ottawa together to formulate the
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. Article VI of the treaty apportioned the
waters of the Milk and St. Mary as one stream for purposes of irrigation
and power.65 The agreement was revised in 1921, and today, the waters of
the rivers are ostensibly divided equally between the two countries during the irrigation season: Canada receives three quarters of the natural
flow of the St. Mary (below 666 cubic feet per second) and the United
States receives one quarter. On the Milk River, each nation's appropriation
is reversed.6 6

61. den Otter, supra note 52, at 211-220.
62. 1 Under Eight Flags at 25-28 (Milk River Hist. Soc'y comp. 1989).
63. Id.
64. Dreiziger, supra note 56, at 220-221.
65. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 6.
66. Telephone conversation with Gerhard Knudsen, Mont. Dept. of Nat. Res. and Conserv.
(Mar. 30,1990). Mr. Knudsen pointed out that under this arrangement "we [Montana] got 80
percent of nothing, and they [Alberta] got 80 percent of a million bucks." He jokingly
employed this hyperbole because the St. Mary is replete with water, whereas the Milk is frequently short. Id.
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The 1921 agreement also provided for the establishment and
maintenance of seven international gauging stations to assure the equitable accounting and apportionment of the two rivers. It is ironic that in
spite of this formal acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the Treaty appropriations, in the real world of allocating the Milk River, water development and water rights allocation in Montana have occurred with little
reference to Canada's undeveloped share of the international waters.
Hence, the gap between the enunciation of water policy by international
67
treaty and water policy implementation "at the ditch" is large.
FEDERAL INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
At the same time that Canadians and Americans were trying to
apportion water from the St. Mary and Milk Rivers, an unrelated conflict
began between Indians of the Fort Belknap Reservation and homesteading nonIndians about the thorny question of which group had "prior"
claim to the downstream segment of the Milk. The conflict arose when
white homesteaders diverted water for irrigation and put the water to use
on their lands. When irrigators from Fort Belknap Indian Reservation later
began diverting water for their lands, white irrigators moved their point
of diversion upstream. On behalf of the Reservation, the United States
filed suit against the homesteaders, who contended that they enjoyed
senior rights to the waters of the river because their diversion predated
that made by the Fort Belknap irrigators. To settle the quarrel, the United
States Supreme Court examined the purpose and intent behind the establishment of the reservation. The Court concluded that agriculture was the
purpose for which the reservation had been established and that neither
sovereign-tribal nor federal-would have knowingly agreed to a land
settlement based on agriculture without implicitly assuming that there
would be water available to make it possible. Thus, the Court held there
was an implied reservation of water with the reservation of the land. Furthermore, the tribes' right to water would be that quantity sufficient to fulfill the purposes for which the reservation was established. The tribes'
right prevailed because the priority date of the its reserved water right
preceded the irrigator's date of first diversion. 68 Today, the Fort Belknap
Indians enjoy priority rights to 125 cubic feet per second of Milk River
water.
The impact of the Winters decision was profound; it cast a
shadow over western water appropriation that extends to the present
time. In essence, it created a separate and distinct status for Indian water
67. On average, 40,000 acre-feet of Canada's apportioned share of the Milk River flows
unused into Montana each year.
68. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 464 (1908).
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users within the emerging state-dominated prior appropriation regime.
Most immediately, the Winters decision triggered a defensive reaction on
the part of white homesteaders in the region. Perhaps its significance is
best described by a current Milk River irrigator, who lives with the implications of the historic decision every day. John Overcast, a prominent irrigator whose farm today includes the 160 acres his father homesteaded
along the Milk River in 1916, told an interviewer:
After the Winters Doctrine, the people in the valley
[non-Indians] wanted to get a better supply of water,
so they banded together in 1908 and formed what they
called the Upper Milk River Water Users Association.
They knew that, since these water rights would be
given to the Indians, they were going to have to seek
water elsewhere. So this was the beginning. To bring in
a reliable
source of water; this is what they organized
69
for.
About the same time, the Lower Milk River Valley Water Users
Association was also formed. Together these two primarily nonIlndian
groups had turned to Montana Senator Thomas Carter for help when the
District Court ruling on Winters held there was an implied appropriation
of water "reserved" with the land.70 Their strategy was bold: they sought
to pass a bill in Congress to open the northern section of the reservation
along the Milk to new settlement. The irrigators thereby hoped to deprive
the Indians of their reserved water right.71 Although this bill was
defeated, local irrigators had demonstrated that they were willing to go to
some lengths to assure an adequate water supply.
Notwithstanding the final Winters determination, which left
much uncertainty about the future allocation of the Milk River among the
residents, over the years white irrigators' persistence led to the construction of a package of storage and conveyance facilities begun in 1907 and
completed in 1936. These include Nelson Reservoir, Sherburne Dam and
Reservoir on Swift Current Creek, a tributary of the St. Mary River out of
Glacier Park, and the St. Mary Canal which diverts water to the Milk. In
addition, drought and public pressure led to the construction of Vandalia
Dam in 1921 and Fresno Dam, the main storage structure on the river
today, which was completed in 1939.72
Contrary to all of this development, which was primarily for the
benefit of whites in the basin, over the years the Indians' reserved water
69. Decker, Milk River Basin Interviews 3 (1989).
70. The United States Supreme Court case Winters was appealed from Winter v. United
States, 143 E 740 (9th Cir. 1906).
71. D. McCool, Command of the Waters: Iron Triangles, Federal Water Development, and
Indian Water 51 (1987).
72. The United States Bureau of Reclamation is responsible for all of these projects.
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rights have existed primarily on paper. The Blackfeet and Fort Belknap
reservations have not developed their lands nor their water rights in a
manner comparable to that of white irrigators in Montana. 73 The reasons
for this difference are diverse-the tribes have not exhibited widespread
interest in farming, much of their land is unsuitable for irrigation, and
74
funding for irrigation on the reservations has been slim and sporadic.
Nevertheless, because the tribes hold uncertain quantities of "reserved"
water for future use, Montana is eager to clarify the nature and extent of
these rights.
The Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission was established by the Montana Legislature in 1979 for this very purpose-to quantify tribal and federal reserved water rights as part of a general stream
adjudication. 75 The Commission is now negotiating with the tribes of the
Fort Belknap and Rocky Boys Reservations on what may begins what be a
prolonged process of negotiation. 76 One reason the process promises to be
prolonged, is "the legacy of decades of conflict between tribal and non77
tribal interests in Montana."
Today's water policy challenge is to overcome the bitter legacy
of the past and find new solutions to the water allocation problems of the
region. As Montana's quantification process proceeds, the tribes' "paper
water rights" possess latent authority that may eventually work toward
the benefit of the Fort Belknap and Blackfeet Tribes. Prominent legal
scholar Charles Wilkinson noted that whenever Indians decide to develop
their unexercised water rights, new water apportionments made on their
behalf will, of necessity, be charged against "prior" state water rights
claims. 78 The same is true for Alberta water rights to Milk River water,
which have been guaranteed by the Boundary Waters Treaty since 1909.
DEFERRED WATER POLICY TRANSITIONS
In a very real sense, the Winters doctrine and the Boundary
Waters Treaty have buffered both Native Americans and Albertans from
73. In the Milk River basin, Fort Belknap Reservation irrigates approximately 10,425 acres
of land, and the Blackfeet irrigate 2,656 acres, in comparison to non-Indian Milk River Project
users who irrigate approximately 127,803 acres of land. United States Bureau of Reclamation,
Present Shortages: Why and How Much (Jan. 1988) (fact sheet distributed at public meetings
in the Milk River basin); Memorandum from R. Moy to M. Jamison, Chief Legal Council,
Governor's Office, Comments for Governor Schwinden Re: Blackfeet Indian Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment and for Permanent Injunction (Sept. 20, 1983).
74. McCool, supra note 71, at 159,256-58. The irrigation project of the Fort Belknap Indian

Reservation, for example, begun in 1903 is not finished yet.
75. Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission, Mont. Code Ann. § 2-15-212
(1979).
76. Id. The Rocky Boys Reservation also has claims to tributary flows of the Milk River.
The Compact Commission is also working to establish a foundation for negotiation with this
group.
77. M. Rundle, The Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission 20 (1988).

78. C. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time and the Law 38 (1987).
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the negative effects of Montana's laissez-faire water policy allocation in
the Milk River basin. Today, state irrigators downstream from the eastern
crossing of the river face recurring water shortages, in large part because
of the state's long-standing, laissez-faire water allocation regime. The virtual historical absence of a centralized system of water record-keeping
until 1973 has helped facilitate the overallocation of the river's limited
resources. As a result, water rights, as yet, are very nearly unenforceable
and "outlaw pumpers" tap the river with little fear of government intervention.
One prominent exception to this harsh reality occurred during
the summer drought of 1988, when whites attempted to "rob" Milk River
water from the Indians, whose reserved rights to the water were guaranteed by the Winters decision. The Bureau of Reclamation 79 publicly
announced in July that further use of the Milk River was restricted to
municipalities and Fort Belknap irrigation. The Bureau backed up these
restrictions with an aerial survey to detect water piracy. They found what
they were looking for: three white irrigators were spotted from the air and
identified. Shortly thereafter, the Department of the Interior took the "outlaw pumpers" to United States District Court. The federal government
sought an injunction to halt immediately the illegal withdrawals. Since the
reservation's water rights were partially quantified by the Winters docfinally took action to enforce the tribes' pretrine, the federal government
80
right.
water
existing
Albertans enjoy comparable legal protection. Their water entitlements are protected by the eighty-year old water allocation formula enunciated in the Boundary Waters Treaty, in spite of the fact that the full
implementation of their apportionment, through actual allocation of
water in their portion of the basin, has been effectively delayed. 8 1 In contrast to Montana's quagmire of uncertain water rights, the administrative
system adopted by the federal government for Alberta's segment of the
river was passed down to the provincial government in 1930.82 There the
issuance of water permits have been carefully controlled and regulated.
Up to 40,000 acre-feet of water stands ready to be claimed.
The effects of judicial mandate (Winters) and international treaty
(Boundary Waters Treaty) have been to postpone a historical transition
that could have been predicted eighty years ago-a transition to a fully
79. P. Gates, History of Public Land Law Development 678 (1968)(editor's note). Originally called the Reclamation Service, the name was changed to Bureau of Reclamation in
June, 1923.
80. Decker, supra note 69, at 1.
81. McCool, supra note 71, makes this case in considerable detail in the broader context of
national politics.
82. D. Percy, The Framework of Water Rights Legislation in Canada 11 (1988). Natural
Resources Transfer Agreements, Constitution Act, 1930, 20-21 Geo. 5, c. 26, § 1 and 2, all
scheds.(consisting of five memoranda of agreements, one for each western Canadian province.)
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appropriated water regime in a region of natural scarcity. What accounts
for the delay? The answers are complex, but of central importance is the
fact that water policies made judicially have not implemented themselves;
nor have water allocations made by international treaty been planned for
by a state and a nation preoccupied with development.
Borrowing from the field of political science casts light on this
particular subject. Several scholars have investigated the differential
implementation of public policies made legislatively, by executive decision and by judicial fiat. Nakamura and Smallwood, in particular, note
that in the United States judicial policy implementation differs because 1)
the scope and power of the courts is constrained by "due process" limitations; 2) courts are passive, they react to cases brought to them; 3) the jurisdiction of the courts is usually limited; and 4) only the parties to a given
case can be forced to comply with the decision of a court. All of these factors were operative in the evolution of tribal reserved rights since the Winters decision, and they help explain why Indian reserved water rights have
been ignored in the Milk River basin.
Exacerbating these factors is the ambiguity which adheres to
judicial mandates and complicates the real world of policy implementation. Winters is a prime example. Although that decision set the ball in
motion for the eventual evolution of the doctrine of reserved water rights,
the process and criteria for determining specific quantities and uses of
reserved waters were left unanswered. Under conditions so uncertain and
unclear, the court's role in the implementation of the decision was
mini84
mal, while that of the policy implementors was (and is) enlarged.
Just who were the implementors in the Winters case? Narrowly
defined, the implementors were: the Department of Justice, who on behalf
of the Department of Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) brought the
case to the Supreme Court; the BIA itself, which oversees water allocation
on the reservation; and the individual Indian and non-Indian parties to
the case. Beyond this immediate circle, there ranged myriad other implementors whose roles were highly complex and diffuse.
Implementors also included the Secretary of Interior, a chief
Indian affairs policy-maker in Washington, D.C., and the Congress of the
United States, which appropriates funds for Indian and non-Indian water
development in a charged political setting. Responsibility for implementing the far-reaching decision of tribal reserved water rights also extended
to state lawmakers and water regulators, whose action (or inaction)
allowed the overdevelopment of whites' water, and who, historically,
showed remarkably8 5little foresight about potential problems regarding
Indian water rights.
83. R. Nakamura & F.Smallwood, The Politics of Policy Implementation (1980).
84. Id. at 90.
85. McCool, supranote 71 explores this issue in some detail.
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Preexisting beliefs and attitudes can also play a significant role in
the practice of judicial policy implementation. In the case of the Milk
River, there has historically been a lack of Indian interest in agriculture.
This fact is rooted in the cultural outlook of the Milk River tribes towards
their natural environment. The Indians of the region were hunters, not
farmers.86 Furthermore, policies such as the Dawes (or Allotment) Act have
87
effectively facilitated the transfer of prime Indian lands to white settlers.
development, and
The consequence has been less Indian agricultural
88
hence, less water development over time.
The doctrine of reserved water rights, a judicial policy, was an
inherently weak instrument for the implementation of public policy to
affect the total range of options available to those who wanted water
development in the Milk River. The more organized and politically powerful irrigators on the Milk River project (primarily whites) essentially
won out, especially in terms of policies and programs to develop their
ability to apply water to their land.
Unlike the case of judicial policy implementation, for many
years the ramifications of international apportionment of the Milk River
was not been closely examined. It is taken for granted that the terms of an
international treaty will be fulfilled and, in fact, in the Milk River this
promises to be true. But no forethought was given to this reality for years
in Montana, as the laissez-faire state water rights permitting process
worked its will. By the 1970s, however, state lawmakers and water managers saw the need for major change.
The old Montana Water Code was completely revised and a
comprehensive effort was initiated to quantify the state's waters. 89 The
implications of this action for transboundary water allocation under the
Boundary Waters Treaty were recognized by 1980. In that year, negotiations were initiated between the State of Montana and the Province of
Alberta to prepare for the transition to Alberta's full use of the river.9 0 The
86. Ewers, supra note 16, at 297, 317.
87. The Dawes Act is also known as the General Allotment Act of 1887, 25 U.S.C. § 331334, 339, 341, 342, 348-49, 354, 381 (1982).
88. R. Hurt, Indian Agriculture in America: Prehistory to the Present 151 (1987). Hurt notes
that from the Dawes Act in 1887 to the Burke Act in 1906, "the theoretical results of federal
Indian policy were far different from the actual effects of federal legislation." Id. By the late
19th and early 20th century the best public lands had been claimed, so settlers turned their
sights on Indian lands. By 1906, Indians could alienate their lands easily, so easily that their
ability to become self-sufficient farmers was eroded to the degree that they were isolated
from the "market web." Id.
89. Montana Water Use Act, Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-101 to 104 (1990). This act (and the
1972 state Constitution) recognized the legitimacy of all previously existing rights, and as of
July 1,1973, the sole manner of obtaining a new water right was to go through a centralized
state permitting process. The adjudication process was added later to identify preexisting
rights.
90. Alberta Plans Impoundment, supra note 7; Alberta Reservoir Update, 2 Milk River Dig. 3

(1989).
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question remains, after eight decades of overappropriation in the lower
portion of the Milk River basin, why did the State of Montana plan so
inadequately for its residents' future use of water and allow the prevailing
circumstances to arise?
It seems clear that Montana failed to take the international
apportionment of the Milk River into account when the state began implementing water policy. This outcome was predictable, for Montana's laissez-faire approach to water allocation predated cooperative international
efforts to develop rational management plans. The operating doctrine was
first-in-time, first-in-right; until the apportionment guaranteed in the 1909
international treaty (and revised in 1921)91 forced a reconsideration.
The province of Alberta is not looking for conflict. It has offered
Montana one possible means to alleviate potential shortages in the lower
portion of the basin: Alberta water managers have proposed Montanans
lease storage space in their new reservoir. A number of meetings between
state and provincial water managers have been held to discuss this topic
and to consider the implications of the dam's construction for water supplies and water quality in the lower portion of the basin.92 Surprisingly, in
a state not noted
for farsighted water planning, real forward strides are
93
being made.
CONCLUSION
Parallel population flows, international competition to settle the
frontier, public-private partnerships to accomplish the task, and lingering
reluctance to recognize nature's limitations were common features of
Canadian and United States experiences in the Milk River region. But
from the early trappers and explorers to later homesteading frontiersmen,
different cultural habits and priorities were introduced on each side of the
49th parallel, which foreshadowed the differing Canadian and American
water policies and the varying levels of water use which eventually
evolved. The more orderly, civil relationships that characterized Cana91. International Joint Commission, Order of Oct. 4, 1921 pertaining to Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909, supra note 6).
92. The author participated in one of these in May 1988.
93. Telephone interview with Curt Martin, Water Planning Supervisor, Mont. Dep't of Nat.
Res. & Cons. (Aug. 29, 1991). "A number of hurdles are being examined to try to convert
obstacles to opportunities." A Milk River Advisory Committee comprised of representatives
of the Fort Belknap, Rocky Boys and Blackfeet Tribes, the irrigation districts and other water
users and interested parties in the basin, is now examining the proposed three phased plan
from a broad, basin-wide perspective. A section of the ongoing Montana State Water Planning process, which ensures considerable public participation, will be devoted to the Milk
River.
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dian-Indian interactions portended the more careful approach that Canada would eventually take toward water appropriation. The American
experience, on the other hand, epitomized rugged individualism-and
water policies constructed on this foundation reflected this fact. The rights
of the majority population were entrenched at the national level, whereas
in Montana, water policies embodied the axiom: "That government is best
which governs least". Once these different cultural predispositions were
institutionalized in two very different federal water policies, they proved
so tenacious that the implementation of Winters and the Boundary Waters
Treaty was effectively deferred.
As the century draws to a close, pressure for equitable allocation
of the scarce waters of the Milk can no longer be ignored. Long-standing
water rights claimants-Native American and Albertans-are working to
realize their historical rights. Montana policymakers are finally developing more careful and controlled water management for improved water
use efficiency, something Canada has worked to assure since the Northwest Irrigation Act of 1894. 9 4 The rights of Indians and Albertans to
develop their shares of the Milk River have been in place since 1908 and
1909, respectively. The question now is, how will the overextended state
water regime make room for these "new" developments?
A number of possible solutions have been examined, developed,
and some even implemented, but all are founded on two precepts very
different from those which governed state water policy in the past: a more
comprehensive basin-wide management scheme and improved water use
efficiency. To realize these principles, state and federal water managers
have been working together to find solutions to the water scarcity problem that plagues the Milk River basin. The basin is now closed to further
water appropriations. A three phase comprehensive plan was proposed to
downstream Montana irrigators in 1988 by state and federal water managers, which includes: 1) a basin-wide joint board of control for improved
basin-wide management;9 5 2) rehabilitation of the irrigation system and
upgraded on-farm irrigation techniques for better water use efficiency; 3)
if necessary (and politically feasible), a new water diversion from the Missouri River; and 4) a possible rental agreement between state irrigators
and Alberta. 96 Phases 1 and 2 are now proceeding. Phases 3 and 4 have yet
94. Northwest Irrigation Act, 57-58 Vic. c. 30, S.C. 1894, c. 30.
95. Telephone interview with Gerhard Knudsen, Asst. Administrator, Water Res. Div.,
Mont. Dep't of Nat. Res. And Conserv. (Mar. 30,1990). The Joint Board of Control will operate
in the lower Milk Basin in Montana. One irrigation district of the eight that exist in the region
has yet to agree to participate in the plan. This irrigation district, Malta, lies in the middle of
the combined Milk River Irrigation Districts. Fort Belknap has agreed to participate. Id.
96. Milk River Brochure, supra note 5.
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to pass. After 100 years of shared use of the Milk River, the goal of these
97
plans is to find a way to provide water for all those who are entitled to it.

97. The situation is further complicated by a perennial federal-provincial struggle in Canada over which branch of government holds ultimate control and oversight of provincial
water resources that cross over the international boundary. This conflict has subjected a provincial-federal cost sharing proposal for the Milk River Dam to recurring delays. Such intergovernmental wrangling in Canada has a long history. E.g. J. Saunders, Interjurisdictional
Issues in Canadian Water Management 21 (1988); Geddes, EnvironmentJurisdiction War Heats
Up, in Financial Post (July 17,1989).

